Husserl's early concept of metaphysics as the ultimate science of reality by Trizio, Emiliano
 Husserl’s Early Concept of Metaphysics  
As the Ultimate Science of Reality 
 
 
Emiliano Trizio 
University of the West of England 
emilianotrizio@hotmail.com 
 
 
Reception date: 04-10-2017 
Acceptance date: 13-11-2017 
 
 
Abstract 
This article reconstructs the development of Husserl’s definition of metaphysics as the 
ultimate science of reality in the courses and lectures written up to the year 1905. The 
analysis of these texts casts light on Husserl’s philosophical self-understanding in the 
wider context of late Nineteenth Century German philosophy as well as on the 
fundamental role that metaphysical interests played in the development of his thought 
from its earliest stage. A particular attention is devoted to Husserl’s early views about 
the relation between the theory of knowledge and metaphysics, whose analysis is a 
necessary preliminary step to address the theoretical issue of the relation between 
transcendental phenomenology and metaphysics. 
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1. Introduction 
The relation between Husserl’s thought and metaphysics has been approached 
in a number of different ways. The questions that, by far, have attracted more 
attention since Husserl’s own time revolve around the so-called metaphysical 
neutrality of phenomenology. In particular, readers of Husserl have tried to 
understand whether pre-transcendental phenomenology could be considered in 
some sense “metaphysically neutral”1 and whether and to what extent the 
                                                          
1 See, for instance, Benoist 1997, Zahavi 2001.  
transcendental turn implies forsaking such neutrality or, perhaps, even 
embracing a form of metaphysical idealism. Consequently, a number of 
publications address questions such as whether phenomenological idealism is 
itself a metaphysical thesis, or whether it has metaphysical implications at all2. 
Directly related to this series of investigations, there lies the general theoretical 
issue of understanding whether Husserl’s phenomenology implies the 
adherence to the metaphysics of presence3, as Heidegger maintained, and 
whether this is to be deemed as a fatal flaw undermining Husserl’s entire 
project. More recently, the metaphysical implications of Husserl’s 
phenomenology have been also explored in relation to the by now not so recent 
revival of metaphysics within analytic philosophy. In this sense, for instance, 
one has discussed the relevance of phenomenological descriptions for the 
analytic debates concerning the so-called “metaphysics of consciousness”4.  
Since these investigations are often motivated by the desire to situate 
Husserl’s thought in the context of contemporary philosophy, thereby probing 
its relevance or fruitfulness for current debates, it is not surprising that the vast 
majority of the literature in this field should question the relation between 
phenomenology and metaphysics, so to speak, from the outside, i.e., by 
employing the word “metaphysics” in one or another among its pre- or extra-
phenomenological senses. In this paper, I will second the choice of those who 
take the opposite path, and try to contribute to the exploration of Husserl’s own 
notion of metaphysics, as a preliminary step to any theoretical assessment of 
the metaphysical implications of transcendental phenomenology5. More 
precisely, I will analyze the genesis of the chronologically first sense in which 
Husserl himself employed this term, namely, metaphysics as the ultimate 
                                                          
2 For an earlier strong metaphysical reading of Husserl’s transcendental idealism, see 
Landgrebe 1949, and, more recently, Moran 2005. Attempts to underplay the 
metaphysical implications of phenomenology are to be found in Carr 1999, Crowel 
2001. On this question, see also Zahavi 2002, 2010, and Zahavi and Boucher 2008. For 
a systematic criticism of the misunderstandings surrounding the notion of 
phenomenological absolute, see Majolino 2016. 
3 See Bernet 1982. 
4 See, for instance, Marbach 2010. 
5 See, for instance, Bancalari 2010, and De Santis’ forthcoming article on metaphysics 
in the Cartesian Meditations. On the relation between metaphysics and the crisis of 
European sciences, see Trizio 2016.  
 science of reality. It is my hope that this kind of investigations will eventually 
help cast light on the general issues I have briefly outlined above, which will 
constitute the broader horizon surrounding this paper. 
Husserl often spoke about metaphysics at least in two different senses: 1) 
the conversion of the empirical sciences of nature and spirit into the ultimate 
sciences of reality by means of a systematic philosophical critique of their 
presuppositions as well as their results, 2) the reconsideration of the world of 
nature and spirit from an ethical, teleological, and theological sense6. In a 
famous and often quoted formulation, Husserl characterizes the second layer of 
metaphysical analyses, as the research concerning the problematic of “…the 
irrationality of the transcendental fact that emerges in the constitution of the 
factual world and of spiritual life: thus, metaphysics in a new sense.”7 This 
problematic is connected with what, in a number of texts from the Cartesian 
Mediations to the Krisis, Husserl calls the “highest and ultimate questions” 
concerning morality, religion and the problems of the sense of humane 
existence, of history, and of the entire word8.  
Now, the limited aim of this paper is to focus on the early versions of the first 
aforementioned concept of metaphysics, which Husserl develops in the 
unpublished lectures and courses up to the year 1905, i.e., at the time Husserl was 
moving away from the approach of the Logical Investigations and was 
developing the insights that would lead to transcendental phenomenology.  A 
point of interests of these writings is that, in contrast with the Logical 
Investigations, where metaphysical problems are mentioned only in passing and 
without offering a general characterization of their nature, they contain explicit 
attempts to define the scope of metaphysics as a science. I will show that the first 
versions of this notion of metaphysics were already at work before the Logical 
Investigations, and that in the years following the publication of this work, 
Husserl develops a complex (albeit provisional and still incomplete) account of 
metaphysics that allows us to appreciate the central role of this kind of researches 
for the elaboration of his entire philosophy. 
 
                                                          
6 See, for instance, Hua XXVIII, p. 182, Hua VII p. 187-188. 
7 Hua VII, p. 188. 
8 For instance, Hua VI, pp. 6-7. 
2. Husserl’s first formulations of the concept of metaphysics 
Some hints about the metaphysical problems arising from the critical analysis 
of empirical sciences are to be found as early as 1892-93 in the texts that 
Husserl wrote in view of the publication of a volume on the concept of space 
(the so-called Raumbuch), which never saw the light of the day9. However, 
while these texts mention metaphysical problems in a way that is fully 
compatible with Husserl’s subsequent treatments of the problem, they contain 
no general and explicit formulation of the nature and task of metaphysics. For 
an early explicit statement concerning the nature of metaphysics, we can instead 
turn to the Logik Vorlesung 1896, in which, while characterizing the nature of 
pure logic as the science of science, Husserl evokes an issue that will play a 
fundamental role throughout his career, up until the Krisis, namely that of the 
incompleteness of the sciences, and, specifically of the empirical sciences. 
After claiming that those sciences are unable, by themselves, to satisfy our 
theoretical interest for reality,10 Husserl explains that they need, in the first 
place, a clarification of their metaphysical presuppositions. Among the latter, 
Husserl includes: 
 
...dass es eine Außenwelt gibt, welche nach Raum und Zeit ausgebreitet ist, dass 
alles reale Werden dem Kausalitätsgesetz unterliegt, dass Widersprechendes 
realiter nicht existieren könne u.dgl.; Voraussetzungen, die zum Teil 
außerordentlich inhaltsreich sind. Ich erinnere nur an die Annahme eines realen 
Raums von der Beschaffenheit einer mathematischen dreidimensionalen 
euklidischen Mannigfaltigkeit mit jener unübersehbaren Fülle von Gesetzen, 
welche die euklidische Geometrie kennen lehrt11. 
 
                                                          
9 For instance, Hua XXI, p. 265 and pp. 270-71 where Husserl defines the metaphysical 
problems of space as those concerning the reality corresponding to our representation 
of space. 
10 “Wir müssen es als eine wichtige Tatsache anerkennen, dass alle Wissenschaften, so 
wie sie jetzt vorliegen, der systematischen Vollendung, der ausreichenden 
theoretischen Begründung ermangeln, die wir im Interesse einer vollen intellektuellen 
Befriedigung von ihnen fordern müssen.” Hua Mat I, p. 4. 
11 Hua Mat I, p. 5. 
 This list of presuppositions looks, in the face of it, rather heteroclite, because it 
contains assumptions concerning the existence of the world (i.e., a matter of 
fact, albeit a singularly significant one), its causal order, and the specific 
structure of its spatiotemporal form (which, in Husserl’s language will always 
count as synthetic a priori principles), as well as a purely formal principle 
stemming from the objective conversion of the principle of contradiction as it 
is formulated in the realm  of pure significations, namely a formal ontological 
principle (i.e., analytic). However, it is clear that these assumptions are needed 
in order to provide a general characterization of what all empirical sciences 
take for granted in their theoretical exploration of the totality of real being of 
which each of them investigates but a single portion. As Husserl’s 
preoccupation is to characterize metaphysics as a science, it follows that 
metaphysics must consist in a unitary theoretical body corresponding to a 
unitary object-domain, rather than in a disconnected series of 
foundational/critical investigations that could be carried out in the framework 
of multiple already existing sciences. Accordingly, he adds that the mere fact 
that those presuppositions lie at the basis of all empirical sciences and thus 
concern the whole of reality, and, further, that they cannot become an object of 
investigation by adopting the same methods used by those sciences entails that 
a science of a new type is called for12. However, the fact that these 
presuppositions are not studied by the different sciences, while implying that 
investigations based on new methods are called for, does not already establish 
that a unitary discipline will encompass the study of this cluster of 
presuppositions. In the next sections, we will see that clarifying the scope and 
unity of metaphysics will constitute a significant challenge in the following 
years of Husserl’s philosophical activity. 
Husserl’s characterization of this science in the Logik Vorlesung 1896 will 
provide the real starting point of this study: 
 
Man nennt sie heutzutage gewöhnlich Erkenntnistheorie, aber sie ist im 
Wesentlichen identisch, oder identisch einem Teil nach, mit der altehrwürdigen 
Metaphysik, der Ersten Philosophie des Aristoteles. Nur vermeidet man gern 
einen Namen, der durch hohle Irrlehren unseres Jahrhunderts einen schlechten 
                                                          
12 Ibid. 
Beigeschmack erhalten hat. Die Wissenschaften bedürfen also fürs Erste einer 
metaphysischen Grundlegung. Darunter ist aber nichts weniger gemeint als eine 
dialektische Herausspinnung der konkreten Resultate dieser Wissenschaften aus 
einer abstrakten Begriffs mystik, sondern, viel bescheidener und fruchtbarer, 
eine nüchterne Klärung und Prüfung jener allgemeinen Voraussetzungen, 
welche die Wirklichkeitswissenschaften über das reale Sein machen, und in 
weitergehender wissenschaftlicher Arbeit die Herstellung der gereiftesten und 
letzten Erkenntnis vom realen Sein, von seinen Elementen, Formen und 
Gesetzen, die der jeweilige Stand der Einzelwissenschaften, der deutera 
philosophia, wie sie Aristoteles nennt, gestattet13. 
 
Husserl claims that this sought-for science is, in his time, habitually referred to 
as the theory of knowledge, although it is either identical or identical in part 
with the time-honored metaphysics, that Aristotle called first philosophy. It is 
important to stress that while this passage seems to suggest that the theory of 
knowledge is in fact identical or partly identical with metaphysics (the latter, as 
we shall see, will indeed be Husserl’s own position, at least in some sense and 
for some time), when taken literally, it actually contains a weaker claim. This 
claim is that the science dealing with the aforementioned presuppositions of 
empirical sciences concerning real being is today named theory of knowledge, 
while that science is identical or partly identical with good old metaphysics or 
first philosophy. In point of logic, this claim is even compatible with a 
restrictive redefinition of the theory of knowledge that would altogether 
expunge metaphysical questions thus understood from its scope. What is still 
missing, in other words, is an explicit delimitation of the fields of the theory of 
knowledge and metaphysics. Instead, Husserl makes the following 
terminological point that is functional to his intention of rescuing the term 
metaphysics from the disrepute brought upon it14: without yet providing a full 
account of the actual relations existing between the theory of knowledge and 
the science whose task is to clarify the presuppositions about real being 
underlying the sciences of the world, one has to acknowledge that that science 
                                                          
13 Ibid.  
14 Which, of course, does not mean that, at that time, Husserl had not already worked 
out the main traits of his position concerning the relations between the theory of 
knowledge and metaphysics. 
 deserves to be called metaphysics, no matter how much its questions tend to be 
regarded today as belonging to the theory of knowledge.   
We will have shortly the opportunity to see to what extent Husserl does not 
share the disdainful attitude of many of his contemporaries for the word 
metaphysics, and for what it evokes. For the moment, it is important to stress 
that this metaphysical foundation of science does not consist in what Husserl 
calls “dialectical reveries” (“dialektische Herausspinnung”) over the results of 
the sciences, but to the already mentioned clarification and grounding of “those 
general presuppositions that the sciences of reality make about real being”, 
followed by a critical work that, so to speak, distills from the results of the 
special sciences the implications for the portions of being they investigate, in 
other words, what is their current contribution to the ultimate knowledge of 
reality. 
This being said, we still need to come to a better understanding of the notion 
of metaphysics thus understood, as well as of its unity as a science, and, on the 
basis of the passage just quoted, we know that this can be accomplished only 
by clarifying the relations between metaphysics and the theory of knowledge. 
Husserl’s solution to this problem will be the main subject of the next two 
sections.   
 
3. Theory of knowledge and metaphysics in the years preceding the 
publication of the Logical Investigations 
A text dated 1898/99 and reproduced in the third of the Materialbände under 
the title Aus der Einleitung der Vorlesung “Erkenntnistheorie und Hauptpunkte 
der Metaphysik” is of fundamental importance to reconstruct the evolution of 
Husserl’s attitude towards metaphysics as well as to begin addressing the issues 
mentioned at the end of the previous section. Furthermore, it provides precious 
elements to trace the remarkable continuity with which this connection has 
hiddenly motivated so much of Husserl’s intellectual development. In addition, 
we find here succinct and clear, albeit unoriginal sketches of the philosophical 
moods dominating German speaking philosophy in the second half of the 
Nineteen Century, supplemented by emphatic statements of Husserl’s own 
attitude towards it, which cast light of what his goals were already before the 
publication of the Logical Investigations. The aim of these lectures is explicitly 
declared a few pages after the beginning, namely to present the theory of 
knowledge as the most fundamental philosophical discipline and to clarify a 
number of key-points of metaphysics (“Hauptunkte”) immediately following 
(“nächststehender”) the theory of knowledge, and that constitute, at present, 
the parts of metaphysics more accessible to a rigorous treatment15. However, 
toward the end of this text, Husserl specifies that explaining why and how the 
fundamental questions concerning the relation between knowledge and being 
determine our entire conception of reality and, thus, are connected to the above 
mentioned key-points of metaphysics, allows him to exemplify and illustrate 
how little our empirical sciences are able, by themselves, to satisfy our 
theoretical interest concerning reality, and to what extent metaphysics, as a 
supplementary science is necessary to this end16. This exemplification is, 
throughout the text, accompanied by several other examples of more specific 
unquestioned presuppositions underlying empirical sciences, which help 
flashing out the entire scope of metaphysics thus understood. In other words, 
this text revolves around two interrelated issues: 1) the relation between the 
theory of knowledge and metaphysics, and 2) the characterization of the 
incompleteness of empirical sciences as a way to assert the legitimacy and 
necessity of a scientific metaphysics that goes “beyond them”, while being built 
on them17. While discussing these two issues, Husserl provides at least a partial 
clarification of his notion of metaphysics. Let us take up these two issues in 
turn, beginning with the problematic relation between the theory of knowledge 
and metaphysics.  
                                                          
15 “Meine Vorlesungen stellen sich zur Aufgabe, die Erkenntnistheorie als die allen 
anderen wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen vorangehende und ihnen das Fundament 
beistellende philosophische Wissenschaft darzustellen und in Zusammenhang mit ihr 
eine Reihe ihr nächststehender Hauptpunkte der Metaphysik klarzulegen. Ich kann 
geradezu sagen: „die“ Hauptpunkte der Metaphysik; nämlich der Metaphysik, soweit 
sie als Wissenschaft gegenwärtig entwickelt ist.” Hua Mat III, p. 230. 
16 Hua Mat III, p. 251. 
17 Husserl, while reminding the reader of the classical anecdote about the fortuitous 
origin of the name “metaphysics” (which, according to a certain tradition, was invented 
by Andronicus of Rhodes), observes that, in some sense, also in light of his own 
characterization, this science goes “beyond” the science of nature (Mat III, p. 233).  
 Several important claims are made in the introductory remarks (pp. 226-
330): 1) the theory of knowledge (“Erkenntnistheorie”) and metaphysics are 
two deeply intertwined fundamental chapters of philosophy (“Hauptgebiete”), 
whose definition, reciprocal delimitation, and even fundamental distinction are 
still much disputed18. Husserl identifies two main parties: those who believe 
that the theory of knowledge and metaphysics make up only one discipline, and 
those who believe that they are two “essentially different disciplines having 
equal rights”. Within the first party, he further distinguishes between, on the 
one hand, those who believe that this single discipline is metaphysics, and that 
the theory of knowledge is only a part of it, and, on the other, those who believe 
that this single discipline is, instead, the theory of knowledge, which would also 
set itself the task to show the impossibility of metaphysics in the traditional 
sense (i.e., presumably, the kind of metaphysics criticized by Kant)19. 2) Not 
only their mutual demarcation (“gegenseitige Abgrenzung”20), but also their 
relations to other scientific disciplines is the object of widespread controversy. 
More specifically, it is debated whether “… beside and beyond the special 
sciences of physical and psychic reality also a metaphysics could enjoy an 
autonomous legitimacy. In addition, there is disagreement as to how the relation 
of the theory of knowledge to logic and psychology is to be intended.”21 3) In 
spite of the uncertainty surrounding these issues, the theory of knowledge is the 
discipline fundamental not only to metaphysics, but also to the totality of 
philosophy and to the worldview stemming from it, in the sense that it is 
                                                          
18 Hua Mat III, p. 225.  
19 “Viele Forscher wollen hier nur eine Disziplin gelten lassen; die einen, weil sie die 
Erkenntnistheorie nur als ein Kapitel der Metaphysik gelten lassen, die anderen, weil 
sie beide Disziplinen geradezu identifizieren. Das Letztere betrifft alle die Philosophen, 
welche den eigentlichen Hauptstamm der metaphysischen Probleme, um die sich die 
Philosophie von Jahrtausenden abgemüht hat, als unlösbar, als die menschliche 
Erkenntnisfähigkeit wesentlich überschreitend ablehnen und nur eine kritische 
Disziplin von der Erkenntnis zugestehen wollen, zu deren Aufgabe es gehöre, die 
prinzipielle Unlösbarkeit dieser Probleme darzutun, also die Unmöglichkeit einer 
Metaphysik im traditionellen Sinn. Auf der anderen Seite gibt es aber eine Reihe von 
Denkern, welche Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik als wesentlich unterschiedene und 
gleichberechtigte Disziplinen auffassen.” Hua Mat III, p. 225-27.  
20 Hua Mat III, p. 226. 
21 Ibid.  
instrumental for them, to the point that Husserl does not hesitate to claim that 
the theory of knowledge also functions as a “Werkzeug” for metaphysical 
research22. 4) Again, in spite of the aforementioned points of disagreement, the 
entire modern philosophical tradition has been unanimous in acknowledging 
the foundational role of the theory of knowledge within the universe of 
philosophical disciplines, while German idealism has represented a failed 
attempt to lead an assault on “… the Olympus of philosophy with dialectical 
arts” undertaken by a race of philosophical “titans” thereafter precipitated into 
the “… dark Tartarus of disagreement and unclarity”23. The end of the romantic 
metaphysical adventures has thus led to the return to Kant as the great “theorist 
of knowledge, who had set limits to the claims of an uncritical metaphysics and 
placed the critique of knowledge as the true foundation of all philosophy.24” 
The current situation is largely the same, adds Husserl, and after recent waves 
of new metaphysical work that Husserl dismisses without specifying what he 
is referring to, the theory of knowledge is back on center stage, facing the new 
challenge represented by the positivism of Mach and Avenarius. 
As for point 1), it is important to notice that Husserl, in this text, does not 
explicitly endorse any of the three alternatives he considers. To be sure, Husserl 
would not have sided with those who think that the theory of knowledge 
absorbs what is left of metaphysics once it has shown the impossibility of its 
traditional version (the second sub-option). An entire portion of this lecture 
reasserts that, if the demise of the metaphysics of German idealism has been by 
itself a positive thing, the positivistic dismissal of metaphysics à la Comte has 
hindered the development of a necessary and rightful aspiration to metaphysical 
knowledge, without the satisfaction of which, the fall into irrationalism is 
                                                          
22 “Wir aber wollen eine Philosophie haben; wir wollen sie uns durch sorgsamste 
Analyse und Kritik erarbeiten. Nach dem Prinzip, dass nur die vollste Klarheit und 
Deutlichkeit der Begriffe eine sichere Erkenntnis ermöglicht, werden wir aller 
Verschwommenheit und Vieldeutigkeit von vornherein den Krieg erklären. Bis zu den 
letzten absolut sicheren Fundamenten der Erkenntnis wollen wir graben, um auf sie 
eine echte und zuverlässige Theorie des Wissens (zu bauen) und damit auch ein sicheres 
Werkzeug metaphysischer Forschung zu gewinnen.” Hua Mat III, p. 228. 
23 Hua Mat III, p. 229. 
24 Ibid. 
 inevitable25. Husserl, thus, vehemently proclaims his belief that, once the 
concept of metaphysics is clarified, it will appear that such science lies within 
the scope of what our cognitive capacities can achieve26. Furthermore, given 
that Husserl here characterizes the theory of knowledge also as an instrument 
for metaphysics, it would seem that the first sub-option is ruled out too: how 
can the theory of knowledge be a chapter of metaphysics if it is to be used as 
an instrument for it? Furthermore, it is a claim reiterated several times in these 
years, that the fatal flaw of all modern theories of knowledge (including Kant’s) 
is that they were not able to establish a theory of knowledge free from 
metaphysical presuppositions, i.e., an authentic pure elucidation of lived-
experiences of which our knowing ultimately consists 27. It would, thus, appear 
that Husserl’s position is represented by the third option: the theory of 
knowledge and metaphysics are two distinct disciplines. However, as we are 
about to see, things are more complicated than that.  
Once more, as it will happen in many subsequent texts, Husserl undertakes 
the elucidation of the concept of metaphysics using Aristotle’s classical 
definition of first philosophy as a starting point. For Aristotle, first philosophy 
was the discipline dealing with what characterizes being in general (being as 
                                                          
25 “Die metaphysischen Bedürfnisse bleiben unbefriedigt, die Metaphysik selbst gilt, 
nach dem Vorgang Comtes, als ein Überbleibsel zurückgebliebener wissenschaftlicher 
Epochen, auf eine Stufe zu stellen mit Alchemie und Astrologie; dafür aber blühen 
Spiritismus und Okkultismus, Aberglaube jeder Art wagt sich breit zu machen – ganz 
wie Beneke dies prophetisch vorausgesehen hat.” Hua Mat III, p. 232. It is noteworthy 
that Husserl quotes a long passage from the work of the Nineteenth Century German 
metaphysician Friedrich Eduard Beneke (1798-1854) System der Metaphysik und 
Religionsphilosophie aus den natürlichen Grundverhältnissen des menschlichen 
Geistes abgeleitet, published in Berlin in 1840, in which metaphysics is characterized 
in a characteristically modern way as dealing with knowledge of ourselves, the world, 
and “das Übersinnliche”, Ibid., pp. 230-231. Once more, it appears that Husserl, while 
adopting a cautious step-by-step strategy in the exploration of metaphysics, holds on to 
the broadest interpretation of its scope. 
26 “Dass eine Wissenschaft von der Art der Metaphysik möglich und berechtigt ist, dass 
sie in die Sphäre menschlicher Erkenntnisfähigkeit fällt, das wird sich nun alsbald 
herausstellen, wenn wir den Begriff der Metaphysik und die ihr zugehörigen Probleme 
erwägen.” Hua Mat III, p. 233. 
27 As is well known, already in those years, Husserl reasserts several times over the 
principle that the theory of knowledge must be free from any metaphysical 
presupposition. See, for instance, Hua Mat III, p. 84. 
such), and preceding all other sciences that investigate only a portion of being28. 
Although Husserl, this time, adds immediately that Aristotle’s definition “… is 
too narrow and in the need of a certain clarification”29, it does build on what he 
deems to be Aristotle’s key-insight, namely that the first principles of being in 
general must be common to all special sciences and logically precede their own 
experimental and theoretical developments. We find here the same claim about 
the existence of metaphysical presuppositions of natural science contained in 
the Logik Vorlesung 1896 and subsequently in § 7 of the Prolegomena, but spelt 
out in a more detailed way and with a different emphasis. Let us delve into the 
details of this analysis. 
All special sciences, we read, take for granted a host of presuppositions 
inherited from the prescientific, natural (natürlich) standpoint: not only that the 
world exists, but that it contains things and processes standing in mutual causal 
connections and, furthermore, a multiplicity of subjects likewise causally 
interconnected with one another and with other components of reality.30 To be 
sure, scientists step-by-step modify the assumptions of the layman, but they 
never radically question these general presuppositions31. In a close and 
problematic connection with these assumptions, scientists are likewise 
oblivious of the riddles affecting their own theoretical operations, i.e., of the 
                                                          
28 Ibid., p. 233. 
29 Ibid., p. 234. 
30 “Den Dingen und den Erkenntnisfragen steht er [the natural scientist] eigentlich 
genauso naiv gegenüber wie der natürliche Mensch vor aller Wissenschaft. Er nimmt 
eben, wie wir vorhin sahen, die Denkarbeit des natürlichen Bewusstseins auf. Die 
umgebende Welt mit ihren Dingen, Vorgängen, Verhältnissen, Regelmäßigkeiten der 
Aufeinanderfolge und Koexistenz findet er schon vor, und er folgt nur den im 
Gegebenen liegenden Motiven zur Modifikation seiner ersten oder schrittweise 
gewonnenen Überzeugungen.” Mat. III, p. 235. This passage anticipates the famous 
pages of Ideas I describing the natural attitude even in the use of terms such as 
“Umgebung” to refer to the different spheres of taken-for-granted objects (Hua III/1, 
pp. 56-58), “vorfinden” to designate the uncritical acquaintance with the world 
characterizing the natural attitude (Hua III/1, pp. 56-61), and “Vorfindlichkeiten”  to 
indicate the posits of the natural attitude themselves (Hua III/1, p. 61).  
31 “Die Begriffe, mit denen sie operieren, entnehmen sie der vorwissenschaftlichen 
Weltauffassung, mit der sie selbst auch beginnen. Modifizierend gehen sie Schritt für 
Schritt weiter, sie wenden die Begriffe so um, wie sie es für ihren Zweck, für die 
Gesetzeserkenntnis brauchen; aber auch nicht mehr.” Hua Mat III, p. 251. 
 difficulties laying in the possibility for our mental operations to secure access 
to such reality. The fundamental question of the theory of knowledge is here 
touched upon: how can a subjective process such as perception or judgment 
gain the right to yield objectively valid knowledge?32 In his more mature 
writings, and especially after the transcendental turn, Husserl often asks this 
question in order to develop the basic ideas of the theory of constitution and to 
highlight how transcendental phenomenology embraces all meaningful 
problems traditionally ranked under the heading of the theory of knowledge33. 
Husserl’s strategy, here, differs in a significant, and I would say, interesting 
way, which the introductory and programmatic nature of this text can explain. 
Husserl shows that different answers to the problem of the possibility of 
objective knowledge lead to completely different conceptions of the being of 
reality, which, in turn, deeply affect the ultimate value of scientific knowledge 
itself, while leaving untouched its prima facie theoretical content. What we find 
here is the idea of a fundamental interdependence between the essence of 
knowledge and the interpretation of the being of reality as such, exemplified 
through a variety of classical positions. The aim is to highlight that scientists, 
because of their uncritical acceptance of the natural standpoint, and because of 
their predominant interest in the practical mastery of nature, leave the 
fundamental epistemological questions open, from which the entire conception 
of the being of reality ultimately depends34.  This point will always provide the 
core of the phenomenological “critique” of science. 
Husserl mentions solipsism, consciousness-idealism (“Bewusstsein-
idealismus”), and positivism: i.e., a doctrine, or, better, a whole family of 
doctrines, which denies the existence of material reality independently of all 
                                                          
32 Hua Mat III, p. 241. 
33 The article of 1917 Phänomenologie und Erkenntnistheorie, reprinted in Hua XXV 
pp. 125-205, contains particularly clear statements of this relation (see, in particular, 
Hua XXV, §§ 32-39).  
34 “…die mannigfaltigen Erfahrungswissenschaften zwar immerfort von der 
Wirklichkeit reden, über sie lehren, in Betreff ihrer Hypothesen und Gesetze 
formulieren und dabei doch nicht (das), was im letzten Grund die Wirklichkeit 
ist, erforschen, weil ihre Tendenz auf Orientierung in der Welt und auf ihre praktische 
Beherrschung gerichtet ist statt auf die innerste Erforschung ihres Seins…” Mat. III, p. 
245. 
mental life35. The subsequent position considered by Husserl is Kant’s, which 
he interprets as one close to idealism, but with the addition of the assumption 
of unknowable things in themselves corresponding both to what we experience 
as our internal life and to the external world36. Again, we have here an 
ontological picture of reality deeply intertwined with an attempted solution of 
the riddles of knowledge. Beneke and Arthur Schopenhauer are briefly 
mentioned as original developments of Kant’s philosophy37. Once more, their 
ways of departing from Kant’s conception of “reality” stem from their different 
appraisal of our capacity to access the inner nature of things, and, more 
specifically, the being attested in our own inner life38. The last point of view 
mentioned by Husserl is realism, which in this list we find, not by chance, at 
the opposite end side of solipsism. Realists are characterized as the thinkers 
closer to common sense, of course, but, more interestingly, as those who believe 
that 
 
…die Zweifel über die Objektivität der Erkenntnis sich lösen lassen, ohne 
<dass> die Grundzüge der Weltauffassung, wie sie sich schon im gewöhnlichen 
Leben ausgebildet haben, dadurch wesentlich tangiert würden.39  
 
Realists, thus, admit the possibility of the knowledge of the material world 
and the existence of two kinds of reality: psychic and physical.40 
The way Husserl closes this list of examples perfectly illustrates its real aim:  
 
Die Beispiele genügen ja, um zu zeigen, wie die schwierigen Grundfragen nach 
der Objectivität der Erkenntnis dahin tendieren, unsere ganze Auffasssung vom 
                                                          
35 Hua Mat III, p. 238. 
36 Ibid., p. 239. 
37 Ibid., pp. 239-40. 
38 Schopenhauer’s views about the relation between natural science and metaphysics, 
while not explicitly playing a significant role in the epistemological debates of the end 
of nineteenth century, deserve to be recalled because they provide a post-Kantian 
redefinition of the boundaries between these two disciplines, and, thereby, of the 
distinction between appearance and reality itself.  
39 Hua Mat III, p. 240. 
40 Ibid. 
 Sein der Welt zu bestimmen, und dass der möglichen Ansichten hier viele 
sind.41  
 
We begin with a certain natural conception of reality, which is also taken for 
granted by all special sciences; we then realize that this conception, when 
critically scrutinized, leads back to the questions of the theory of knowledge. 
Finally, we realize that different solutions to these questions imply different 
conceptions of the being or reality.  
Thus, the answer to question concerning the objective validity of knowledge 
acts as a field of force capable, so to speak, of deforming the metaphysical 
scaffolding of the world, i.e., our entire conception of the being of the world. 
Realism appears precisely as that position that altogether rejects, or tries to 
minimize, the deformation of everyday worldview produced by the riddles 
concerning the possibility of objective knowledge. This interdependence 
between the theory of knowledge and the interpretation of being is much more 
interesting than the trivial repercussions of a theory of knowledge on the 
worldview based on it, which are due to the fact that one’s theory of knowledge 
determines what the possible objects of reliable knowledge are. This is of 
course true: for instance, different degrees of skepticism about the range of 
objects accessible to our knowledge would indeed result in worldviews whose 
“ontological population” varies accordingly. However, here, the problem does 
include, but also reaches far beyond than that of determining what counts as an 
object of possible knowledge, for it concerns the interpretation of the being of 
everything we believe to exist and to be knowable at any level of objectivity 
and in any sense. An obvious example is, once more, Kant’s theory of 
knowledge, which makes the entire natural world, inasmuch as it is studied and 
determined by the natural sciences, “degrade” to a phenomenal being, beyond 
which, if one is to follow the most common reading of Kant, as Husserl does, 
there lies the unknowable thing in itself. This kind of considerations allows 
Husserl to connect his analyses to the epistemological status of the existing 
empirical sciences. In few paragraphs, Husserl shows that those sciences do not 
in fact and cannot in principle completely satisfy the theoretical interest from 
which they themselves stem, i.e., they cannot come to an ultimate 
                                                          
41 Hua Mat III p. 241. 
understanding of the being they investigate, and this precisely because they do 
not question the natural standpoint within which they operate42. This must be, 
therefore, the task of a different science: 
 
Diese Wissenschaft ist, wie ich nicht zu sagen brauche, die Metaphysik. Sie hat 
zu erforschen, was dem Seienden in letztem Grunde zukommt; und damit in 
innigstem Zusammenhang stehen, wie wir letzthin sahen, die Fragen nach den 
obersten Erkenntnisprinzipien, die uns das Erreichen der realen Wahrheit 
ermöglichen sollen und von deren Lösung die Bestimmtheiten, die wir dem 
realen Sein zuschreiben, so wesentlich abhängen.43 
 
This passage contains an explicit definition of metaphysics as a science that 
investigates what ultimately “pertains” to what is, and whose investigation must 
be carried out in connection with the questions concerning the highest 
principles of knowledge.  
  After this brief characterization of the relation between the theory of 
knowledge and metaphysics, and, in particular, of the dependence of the key-
points of metaphysics on the kind of answer that one gives to the problem of 
knowledge, let us now turn to the above mentioned second fundamental theme 
of this text, namely to a more explicit and detailed characterization of the 
incompleteness of empirical sciences, and, consequently, of the thematic 
horizon of metaphysics as the science completing them. Given that such 
incompleteness always consists in the uncritical acceptance of presuppositions 
on the part of the empirical sciences, an account of at least the main different 
kinds of such presuppositions is necessary. Since Husserl discusses over and 
over this theme on the basis of different examples44, it is advisable to sum up 
what results from his various incomplete expositions. 
                                                          
42 “Bei diesen schwierigen und erfolgreichen Bestrebungen liegen aber dem 
Erfahrungsforscher die Fragen nach dem Wesen der Erkenntnis und des Seins, die 
Fragen, worauf sich der Objektivitätswert der Erkenntnis stützt und was das erkannte 
Sein im letzten Grund ist, gänzlich fern” Hua Mat III, p. 242. My emphasis. 
43 Hua Mat III, p. 245, my emphasis. Husserl also calls metaphysics 
“Wirklichkeitswissenschaft kat’exochen”, the science of reality par excellence, ibid. 
44 Hua Mat III, pp. 234-235, 246-251, 251-252. 
 At the most general level, Husserl distinguishes between those assumptions 
on reality that are common to all sciences, and those explaining specific groups 
of phenomena and, thus, pertaining to a special science45. The former are “tacit 
and wholly unproved”46 assumptions, while latter are explicit. In the first group 
we find presuppositions that are easy to make explicit, such as “the world 
exists” or one of another formulation of the principle of causality; however 
Husserl, much more often, lists, under the heading of general assumptions about 
reality, concepts, or better fundamental concepts (“Grundbegriffe”)47. What he 
means is that such concepts stand in need of clarification and elaboration, which 
will show us, in the first place, “what in consideration of reality we are entitled 
to assume and what we are not”48. In other words, these concepts are 
fundamental components of implicit assumptions about reality that are not 
critically scrutinized. The following is the most comprehensive list of 
fundamental concepts in this text: “Thing and property, cause and effect, matter 
and energy, being and appearance, to come into existence and to decay, unity 
and multiplicity, space and time, etc.”49 Some of these concepts are purely 
formal in character and, hence, belong to the field of pure logic. And indeed, 
Husserl immediately adds that the value for the exploration of reality of a great 
quantity of general propositions belonging to pure logic and pure mathematics 
is taken for granted in the scientific exploration of reality50. What Husserl does 
not explicitly say is that the assumptions of this last type concern the whole of 
reality and yet they are not tacit. Hence, they should form a group apart, as 
indeed they do according to Husserl himself. Husserl spends some words to 
illustrate questions connected to the classical Aristotelian problem of a 
                                                          
45 Hua Mat III, p. 246. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Hua Mat III, p. 249, pp. 251-252. 
48 Hua Mat III, p. 252. 
49 Hua Mat III, pp. 251-252. 
50 Hua Mat III, p 252. 
clarification of the different senses of being51, to the notion of substance and 
change52, and to the paradoxes of movement53.  
After these fundamental concepts and presuppositions concerning the whole 
of reality, Husserl considers the second group of assumptions, namely the 
explicit hypotheses pertaining to the individual sciences54. A question that 
presents itself at this point is the following: why would the elucidation of such 
hypotheses belong to metaphysics, as Husserl maintains, if the thematic space 
of metaphysis is opened up precisely by the existence of unquestioned 
assumptions concerning the whole of reality? In other words, is there a tension 
between the quasi-Aristotelian way in which Husserl introduces the concept of 
metaphysics, and his claim that also the elucidation of the special sciences’ 
conceptual material falls within the scope of metaphysics?55 The answer lies, 
presumably, in the nature of the metaphysical elaboration of the conceptual 
material of the special sciences. Metaphysics is not called for to replace existing 
scientific theories with new ones, but only to clarify their sense on the basis of 
the deeper and more general insights into the nature of reality that are gained in 
                                                          
51 Hua Mat III, p. 247. 
52 “Die einen identifizieren dann diesen tragenden Hintergrund oder dieses Wesen der 
Erscheinungen mit der Materie der Physik, die anderen hingegen mit den Kräften, die 
sie als etwas Seelenartiges auffassen, beim Menschen aber als die Seele selbst; sie ist 
die verborgene Substanz des Dinges, das wir Mensch nennen.(…) Während wir so auf 
der einen Seite subtile und weit ausgesponnene Untersuchungen über das Wesen der 
Substanz als des unbekannten Trägers der Eigenschaften und als des inneren Seins der 
Dinge finden, hören wir auf der anderen Seite, all diese Forschungen seien nichtig, es 
gebe keine Substanzen, sondern nur Komplexionen von Eigenschaften.” Hua Mat III, 
p. 249. 
53 Hua Mat III, p. 250-251. 
54 This passage contains a list of useful examples taken from the natural sciences of the 
time: “Auf der anderen Seite gibt es besondere Annahmen der einzelnen 
Erfahrungswissenschaften, z.B. die verschiedenen Gattungen und Arten von 
Molekülen und Atomen in ihren substantiellen Besonderungen und Gruppierungen, die 
mannigfaltigen Arten von longitudinalen und transversalen Schwingungen, der Äther 
mit seinen wunderbaren Eigenschaften, in älterer Zeit die verschiedenen Fluida u.dgl. 
Hierher gehören die besonderen Gesetze der Physik, Chemie, Physiologie usw., soweit 
sie wirklich sind, als was sie ausgesprochen werden, Gesetze, die auf die wirkliche Welt 
zu gehen beanspruchen.” Hua Mat III, p. 247. 
55 A claim that, as we have seen, Husserl had made already in the Logik Verlesung 
1896. 
 the critical elucidation of the first group of assumptions. In other terms, this 
second, more applied part of metaphysics is edified in light of the results of the 
first, more classically Aristotelian part of metaphysics that deals, one could say, 
with reality qua reality. Thus, the kind of elucidation that is here in question is 
one that is made possible by the integration of those sciences (of “second 
philosophy”) into the unitary edifice of the ultimate science of reality and 
receives its sense only in virtue of it. Under this interpretation, thus, the 
aforementioned tension is eliminated. 
It is now possible to conclude this analysis of the 98’/99’ lecture, by drawing 
some general conclusions about Husserl’s early notion of metaphysics. This 
text shows that, before the publication of the Logical Investigations, Husserl 
already believes that the theory of knowledge functions as an instrument for a 
metaphysics consisting in the ultimate clarification of reality as investigated by 
the empirical sciences. In light of this, it would be a mistake to think that, in 
contrast with what will happen after the transcendental turn, at the time of the 
Logical Investigations, Husserl saw phenomenology (that is the discipline that, 
for Husserl, takes up the fundamental questions of the theory of knowledge) as 
an enterprise disconnected from metaphysics (let alone anti-metaphysical). 
Precisely the opposite is true: already at the time of the Logical Investigations 
Husserl considers that the gigantic task of the elucidation of knowledge that 
phenomenology has undertaken is motivated by the desire to build a philosophy 
in the most general sense, a philosophy in which metaphysics as the ultimate 
science of reality is a fundamental chapter. 
However, the relation between the theory of knowledge and metaphysics is 
still affected, at this stage, by a certain unclarity and so is, therefore, the identity 
of metaphysics as a science. This unclarity is reflected by some of Husserl’s 
claims concerning precisely the key-points of metaphysics that are so intimately 
connected to the theory of knowledge. In particular, if adjudicating between what 
Husserl calls “metaphysical convictions”56 (such as idealism, positivism, 
Kantianism, and realism) or ruling all of them out, in favor of a radically different 
general account of being (which this texts leaves open as a possibility and which 
will indeed be Husserl’s own solution, once transcendental idealism is in place) 
is something carried out within the theory of knowledge, then the mutual 
                                                          
56 Hua Mat III, p. 255, 
delimitation between the former and metaphysics stands in need of further 
clarification. As we have seen, Husserl characterizes the key-points of 
metaphysics as those metaphysical issues that stand closer to the questions of the 
theory of knowledge. Towards the end of the text, however, we find two passages 
that connect them to the theory of knowledge in an even more intimate way:  
 
Bei der Kürze der uns zu Gebote stehenden Zeit wird es besser sein, uns sogleich 
möglichst direkt in die Grundfragen (zu) vertiefen, die unter dem Namen der 
erkenntnistheoretischen teils eine allgemeine Voraussetzung aller 
Wissenschaften bilden und teils auch, gefasst in besonderer Beziehung auf das 
Sein an sich, als fundamentale Fragen der Metaphysik gelten müssen57. 
 
Daraus entspringen nicht bloß erkenntnistheoretische, sondern schon 
metaphysische Überzeugungen der Art, wie wir sie in der Einleitung berührt 
haben, die Lehren des Bewusstseinsidealismus und Positivismus, der alle 
Erkenntnis auf die subjektiven Phänomene einschränkt im Gegensatz zum 
Realismus, der eine Erkenntnis von transzendenten Wirklichkeiten für möglich 
und für uns erreichbar anerkennt58. 
 
This first passage (which, to be sure, is not terribly clear) states that the 
“Grundfragen” that go under the name of “erkenntnistheoretisch” in part form 
the epistemological background of all the sciences, in part, in so far as they are 
grasped in specific relation to being in itself, must also be reckoned among the 
fundamental questions of metaphysics. I take the expression “all sciences” to 
refer to the empirical as well as the logical and mathematical ones. Under this 
reading, Husserl is here referring to the fact that there are fundamental 
questions of the theory of knowledge such as “what is truth?”, “how can a 
subjective lived-experience grasp an objective content whatsoever?”, “how can 
an ideally identical judgment be reiterated at different times and by different 
subjects?”, which, in their generality, refer to the possibility of knowledge of 
any object whatever, including numbers and purely logical objects. In this 
generality, these questions are not directly metaphysical in character, because 
metaphysics is, for Husserl, concerned solely with real being and not with ideal 
                                                          
57 Hua Mat III, p. 252. 
58 Hua Mat III, p. 255. My emphasis.  
 objects. On the other hand, there are “other” fundamental questions of the 
theory of knowledge that result from narrowing down the same aforementioned 
general questions to the knowledge of the real-transcendent being (“Sein an 
sich”) investigated by empirical sciences.59  
The second passage refers exclusively to the problem of real transcendence 
and states that the already mentioned general positions such as idealism and 
realism are, by themselves, not only epistemological, but also already 
metaphysical. In sum, these two passages suggest that the theory of knowledge 
is either already a part of metaphysics (when it deals with the problem of real 
transcendence), or, (when it deals with the possibility of knowledge in general) 
a discipline that, in virtue of a redirection of its focus on real being, can be 
apprehended as a part of metaphysics. To be sure, this claim does not conflict 
with the aforementioned metaphysical neutrality of the theory of knowledge, 
for Husserl assigns to the theory of knowledge the task of establishing the first 
general principles of metaphysics. In other words, its results would also 
constitute the first chapter of metaphysics, in such a way that no metaphysical 
claims would count as a presupposition for the work of the theorist of 
knowledge. Yet, there is indeed a tension between these claims and the thesis 
that the theory of knowledge functions as an instrument for metaphysics, 
because, now, the theory of knowledge appears to be also the first level of the 
edifice of metaphysics. Under this interpretation, among the three alternative 
conceptions of the relation between the theory of knowledge and metaphysics 
considered at the beginning of this section, Husserl would seem, surprisingly, 
to opt for the one that makes the theory of knowledge, as a unitary discipline, a 
part of metaphysics. We will see that the courses written in the years following 
the Logical Investigations cast some light on this issue as well as on other 
aspects of Husserl’s “early” concept of metaphysics.   
 
                                                          
59 It should be added that, as we have seen, also mathematical and logical principles 
belong to the uncritically accepted presuppositions of empirical sciences (obvious 
example, the principle of contradiction that Husserl had evoked already in the 1896 
lecture), and, consequently, also the part of the theory of knowledge that focuses 
exclusively on these principles can be apprehended as a contribution to the 
metaphysical clarification of reality as posited by the empirical sciences. 
4. Formal and material metaphysics in the years preceding the 
transcendental turn 
Some useful, if cursory remarks on the nature of metaphysics can be found in 
the course Logik 1902/0360, in the Allgemeine Erkenntnistheorie Vorlesung 
1902-0361, and in the Urteilstheorie Vorlesung 190562. Those remarks are in 
line with the position so far outlined, but provide further insights into Husserl’s 
views about the subject as well as conceptually significant terminological 
novelties that can help clarify the relation between the theory of knowledge and 
metaphysics.  
In the course Logik 1902/03, Husserl outlines the task of metaphysics in a 
very succinct and effective way. Once more, Husserl begins by recalling that 
“Metaphysics is, as Aristoteles puts it, ‘First Philosophy’”63 and that, for 
Aristotle, it is the science of “what pertains to being in generality”64. This time, 
however, he explicitly explains why he believes that Aristotle’s definition is too 
narrow: granted that the polysemy of the general concept of being, and the 
particular problems connected to “being in the sense of reality”65 raises many 
difficulties, the very nature of the problem at hand requires a broader 
interpretation of Aristotle’s definition. It is such broader science that, according 
to Husserl, corresponds to the modern conception of metaphysics66. In light of 
our results, the nature of the problem in question is the ultimate determination of 
reality that goes beyond the provisional and relative one offered by the empirical 
sciences. Indeed, Husserl identifies the broader scope of metaphysics with the 
already mentioned assumptions that are common to all the sciences, and whose 
elucidation makes possible the ultimate interpretation of the being they 
investigate. Although Husserl does not repeat it here, we now know that the 
problem of the polysemy of the word “being” defines only a portion of these 
questions. Finally, Husserl reformulates the opposition between metaphysics and 
                                                          
60 Hua Mat II. 
61 Hua Mat III. 
62 Hua Mat V. 
63 Hua Mat II, p. 11. 
64 “… was dem Seienden in Allgemeinheit zukommt.” Ibid. 
65 “… Sein im Sinne der Realität. ” Ibid.  
66 Ibid.  
 the special sciences of physical and psychical nature as the opposition between 
“the science of absolute being and absolute determinations of being” and the 
sciences in relative sense67. It is noteworthy that what is here meant by “absolute 
being” is nothing but the being that attests itself as real in light of the critique of 
the unproved principles underlying the special sciences68. 
The Allgemeine Erkenntnistheorie Vorlesung 1902-03 briefly mentions 
again the problem of the mutual delimitation of the theory of knowledge and 
metaphysics and the aforementioned disagreement as to whether they should 
count as one and the same discipline or as two distinct ones.  Once more, 
Husserl does not explicitly endorse either of the conflicting views, nor does he 
name any of their advocates. However, the thesis that one should maintain the 
distinction between the two is formulated in a way that, to say the least, 
resonates with Husserl’s general approach: 
 
Während die Metaphysik, sagen sie, die letzte Seins- und Welterkenntnis bieten 
will, die uns aufgrund der Einzelwissenschaften zugänglich, aber nicht in ihnen 
selbst gegeben ist, komme das reale Sein für die Erkenntnistheorie nur in 
hypothetisch allgemeiner Weise in Betracht, nämlich nur als Korrelatum von 
Erkenntnis und Wissenschaft; nur von den in den Ideen Erkennen und Sein 
gründenden Notwendigkeitsbeziehungen, nicht aber von dem, was nun 
tatsächlich und in letztem Grund ist, habe sie zu handeln69.  
 
Both the theory of knowledge and metaphysics, according to this point of view, 
deal with real being, but real being becomes thematic within the theory of 
knowledge only in so far as there obtain necessary relations grounded in the ideas 
of knowledge and being that set general conditions for any real being whatever. 
                                                          
67 “Danach kann die Metaphysik auch als Wissenschaft vom absoluten Sein oder von 
den absoluten Seinsbestimmungen definiert werden, im Gegensatz zu den 
Einzelwissenschaften, die nur Wissenschaften im relativen, d.i. im vorläufigen, für die 
praktische Orientierung in der Erscheinungswelt und für die praktische 
Naturbeherschung zureichenden Sinne.” Hua Mat II, p. 12. 
68 “Selbstverständlich ist unter den Titel absolutes Sein an keinerlei mystisch 
Überspanntheiten zu denken, sondern es handelt sich ganz nüchtern um das Sein, das 
sich uns als das wirkliche aufgrund der Kritik der Einzelwissenschaften und die ihnen 
ungeprüft zugrunde liegenden Prinzipien herausstellt.” Hua Mat II, pp. 12-13. 
69 Mat. III, pp. 9-10. 
The real being in question in the theory of knowledge is, thus, considered ex 
hypothesi, whereas metaphysics aims to determine what in fact exists, based on 
the results of the special sciences. That this is, at bottom, Husserl’s own view is 
indicated by that fact this distinction between metaphysics and the theory of 
knowledge reflects the distinction between fact and essence, and that, according 
to Husserl, the theory of knowledge must investigate and elucidate the essence of 
knowledge. Under this reading, Husserl would now side with the view that the 
theory of knowledge and metaphysics are actually two distinct disciplines. This 
seems to contradict the conclusion of the previous section, where it appeared that 
the theory of knowledge is already the first stage of metaphysics, and, hence, it 
can be included in it. However, as we shall now see, the terminology of the 
Urteilstheorie Vorlesung 1905 is finally able to dissolve these tensions and to 
highlight the unitary approach that surfaces throughout the different texts so far 
analyzed. 
In this lecture, Husserl gratifies us with a detailed series of definitions of the 
various disciplines that we have encountered so far. 1) Pure logic is the “science 
of the ideal constituents and laws of theory in general, or […] the science of 
truth and objectivity in general. Conceived so broadly, as it must be conceived, 
pure logic is identical with the mathesis universalis.”70 Note that formal 
ontology is included in the mathesis universalis and results from a conversion 
of the logical truths to the realm of pure objectivity. 2) The theory of knowledge 
is the discipline intimately connected to pure logic that studies the relations 
between “truth and objectivity, on one side, and judging and knowing truth and 
objectivity respectively on the other.”71 Given that pure logic already sets 
general laws that must be valid for any object whatever, and given that the 
theory of knowledge determines the sense of knowledge, but also the sense of 
the being grasped in knowing, pure logic and the theory of knowledge jointly 
make up formal metaphysics72 or the formal science of being73, i.e., the part of 
the ultimate science of being that does not make assertions about (nor 
                                                          
70 Hua Mat V, p. 41. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Hua Mat V, p. 29. 
73 Hua Mat V, p. 41. 
 presupposes) any factual being74. Indeed, the expression “Sinn des Seins”, 
which will be of fundamental importance for Husserl’s transcendental idealism, 
already appears in this lecture as a problem title for formal metaphysics75. 3) 
Rooted in formal metaphysics is material metaphysics76 or metaphysics in the 
authentic sense77, which determines “what now factually, in categorial sense, 
is, what pertains to real being not only in general and as such, but de facto 
according to the results of the specific sciences of being.”78 4) The text also 
adds that phenomenology of knowledge, as “the descriptive discipline of the 
essence of thought” is the only possible terrain for the solution of the problems 
of the theory of knowledge79.  
With the aid of these definitions, we can now try to dissolve the tensions 
that we have previously pointed out. What is the relation between the theory of 
knowledge and metaphysics? Are they one or two disciplines? At this stage, 
Husserl appears to answer along the following lines. If one defines metaphysics 
as the science of what ultimately pertains to real being in full generality, then 
one must admit that the theory of knowledge (as well as pure logic) is a part of 
metaphysics, and, more specifically, the formal part of metaphysics. In 
particular, the theory of knowledge, by investigating the sense of being of 
reality, addresses problems that in a misguided way (at this point one is entitled 
to add) have traditionally motivated metaphysical positions such as idealism 
and realism. However, metaphysics in the authentic sense, for Husserl, is only 
the one that investigates what, based on the empirical sciences, is in fact true, 
                                                          
74 In this text, Husserl already stresses the difference between his understanding of the 
theory of knowledge (and of the “skeptical” attitude inbuilt in it) and Descartes’. A 
consequence of the purely “formal” character of Husserl’s theory of knowledge is that 
the solution to its problems would in no way modify the theoretical content of the 
special sciences (whether a priori or empirical), Hua Mat V, p. 35. This prefigures 
another overarching theme of transcendental phenomenology, i.e., the opposition to any 
metaphysics positing “metaphysical substructions” (Hua VII, p. 235) and its 
replacement by the elucidation of the sense of being of reality accomplished by the 
theory of transcendental constitution.  
75 Hua Mat V, p. 29. 
76 Hua Mat V, p. 29. 
77 Hua Mat V, p. 41, 
78 Hua Mat V, pp. 41-42. 
79 Hua Mat V, p. 42. 
and not only the “formal” or “general” structure of being. The difference in 
both object and methodology between this authentic a posteriori metaphysics 
and the theory of knowledge fully justifies the claim that we are confronted 
with two different disciplines. Furthermore, the theory of knowledge can also 
be considered as an instrument for authentic metaphysics in this sense. In sum, 
Husserl adopts a nuanced intermediate solution between the two opposing 
parties mentioned already in the 1898/99 lecture, because, while 
acknowledging that the theory of knowledge and metaphysics are two 
thematically and methodologically distinct disciplines, one of which is 
fundamental to the other, there is also a sense in which they both directly 
contribute to the understanding of what real being ultimately is. 
Let us however notice that, in spite of its clarity, the classification of 
disciplines presented in Urteilstheorie Vorlesung 1905 fails to specify what 
discipline would deal with some of the unclarified presuppositions on which 
empirical sciences rest. In section 2, the list of such presuppositions mentioned 
in the Logik Vorlesung 1896 appeared heteroclite and in need of clarification. 
Such list was expanded and, to an extent, clarified in the 1898/1899 lecture, as 
we have seen in section 3. In the Urteilstheorie Vorlesung 1905, some of these 
assumptions, being the object of pure logic, fall in formal metaphysics, some 
others, such as the existence of the world (or better, at this stage, the sense of 
its existence), must be clarified by the theory of knowledge and, hence, belong 
to formal metaphysics too, finally, the properly empirical ones, which are dealt 
with in the process of clarification of the content of the empirical sciences, 
pertain to material metaphysics. However, general a priori presuppositions 
about reality such as those of geometry or those pertaining to the notion of 
causality do not find a place here. They are a priori, but not purely formal, and 
they by no means belong to the theory of knowledge, nor to the broader field 
of phenomenology. Thus, the characterization of metaphysics presented in the 
Urteilstheorie Vorlesung 1905, while clarifying the relation between the theory 
of knowledge and metaphysics remains incomplete. In the Einführung in Logik 
und Erkenntnistheorie 1905/06, a course in which Husserl already presents a 
version of the phenomenological reduction, we find an attempt to fill this gap 
by introducing the notion of an a priori ontology of the real, which deals 
 precisely with these a priori truths about reality.80 Regretfully, the terminology 
introduced there clashes with the one of the Urteilstheorie Vorlesung 1905, for 
this a priori ontology of reality is called [sic] “formal metaphysics”, although 
Husserl immediately specifies that the term is inappropriate.  
The a priori ontology of the Real is, we could again say, formal metaphysics, 
though, the term is better avoided. Metaphysics in the authentic sense is material 
metaphysics. The former, we could further say, is a priori, the latter, a posteriori 
metaphysics. The former is prior to all empirical sciences; the latter comes after 
the empirical sciences81. 
An analysis of this course, however, would already lead us beyond the 
limited scope of this study, as does the subsequent developments of Husserl’s 
thought, whereby the a priori ontology of the real will be in turned articulated 
in the a priori ontological disciplines pertaining to the different ontological 
regions.  
 
5. Conclusion: metaphysics as the horizon of Husserl’s thought 
We have enough elements to draw some conclusions concerning Husserl’s 
notion of metaphysics before the so-called transcendental turn. Husserl’s 
thought was motivated from the outset by the project of developing a 
philosophy corresponding to the highest ambitions of the European tradition. 
In this programmatic framework, metaphysics presents itself as the crowning 
discipline, the one dealing with the fundamental questions concerning the 
totality of the real being of the world and of anything that might lie “beyond 
it”. Within this approach, Husserl does not appear to be preoccupied by the 
                                                          
80 Hua XXIV, pp. 95-102; 1984, pp. 93-99. 
81 Hua XXIV, p. 102; 1984, p. 99. The use of the expression “formal metaphysics” in 
this context is certainly motivated by the fact that the a priori ontology of the real, while 
not purely formal in the sense of pure logic, can be said to investigate “the a priori form 
of reality”. Note also that the material metaphysics here mentioned coincides, instead, 
with that of the Urteilstheorie Vorlesung 1905. Finally, note that the term “material” 
does not refer to the Husserlian notion of material a priori. What Husserl calls “material 
a priori disciplines”, such as geometry, here fall, instead, in the a priori ontology of the 
real. 
complex historical evolution of the concept of metaphysics from Aristotle’s 
characterization up to its Kantian and post-Kantian developments. Rather, as is 
typical of his method, he appropriates a motive from the tradition and elaborates 
it in light of the theoretical developments and the resulting constraints 
characterizing his philosophical situation. The situation in question is one 
marked by the collapse of German idealism, by the rise of the anti-metaphysical 
stance of various forms of positivism, and by an often-exclusive focus on the 
theory of knowledge in name of a one-sided return to Kant. To use a term that, 
for better or worse, will play a significant role in Husserl’s philosophy only 
several years later, the situation of metaphysics is one of crisis. Husserl’s 
reaction to this crisis consists in the first place in fastening metaphysics in the 
strongest possible way to the soil of the theory of knowledge, conceived de jure 
as the fundamental philosophical discipline, and yet, at the same time, as a 
discipline de facto motivated by metaphysical interests. Further, it consists in 
provisionally restricting the thematic focus to the parts of metaphysics that are 
contiguous to the theory of knowledge. Finally, it consists in turning to the 
empirical sciences for the conceptual material on which an authentic science of 
real being must be built. The result of these three moves is the project of 
developing, first of all, a metaphysical foundation of the sciences of nature and 
of the psyche grounded in the parallel development of a mathesis universalis 
and of a pure theory of knowledge. As we have seen, a more precise 
characterization of this project implies an uneasy redefinition of the relation 
between the theory of knowledge and metaphysics, a redefinition that forces 
Husserl, at times, to struggle with his terminology and to modify it in ways 
whose underlying substantial significance should not be overestimated.   
The more Husserl tries to be faithful to the spirit of what he regards as the 
Aristotelian notion of first philosophy, the more it appears that also the mathesis 
universality and the theory of knowledge should count as metaphysics, i.e., as the 
formal or a priori part of it. The former contains laws that are a priori valid for 
any being, while the latter determines the sense of being of the world, and rules 
out its wrong metaphysical interpretations. On the other hand, the more Husserl 
identifies the proper aim of metaphysics with the determination of what in fact 
exists in an ultimate and irrelative sense, the more metaphysics appears to be only 
the factual science of reality that results from elucidating empirical sciences by 
means of the essential insights gained by the mathesis universalis and by the 
 theory of knowledge.82 Husserl moved decidedly towards the second solution, by 
stressing that the authentic metaphysics can only be the one that speaks of what 
in fact exists. And, indeed, the solution outlined in the Urteilstheorie Vorlesung 
1905 will not enjoy an enduring fortune in Husserl’s corpus. Already in the in 
course Einführung in Logik and Erkenntnistheorie 1905/06, Husserl introduces 
significant terminological changes. Neither formal logic, nor the theory of 
knowledge are now treated as the a priori part of metaphysics, not even in a non-
authentic sense,83 while the theory of knowledge is, nonetheless, characterized as 
first philosophy84, signaling that Husserl is abandoning the traditional 
identification between first philosophy and metaphysics.85 Let us add, that in the 
lecture delivered in Göttingen in 1909 Einführung in die Phänomenologie der 
Erkenntnis, Husserl will be even more adamant in sharply distinguishing the 
theory of knowledge from metaphysics and in claiming that the former is not 
metaphysics, but only the foundation for it86. In turn, the denomination of first 
philosophy will be coherently used for phenomenology itself87. In short, after the 
transcendental turn, the characterization of metaphysics in terms of knowledge 
of the ultimate facticity will become even stronger. By that time, however, 
transcendental phenomenology will provide a clearer sense in which a factual 
being can be said to be ultimate. 
 
 
 
                                                          
82 Subsequently, Husserl will add the different material ontologies to the stock of eidetic 
sciences that take part in the foundation of empirical sciences. 
83 Only in a footnote Husserl still refers to formal-ontological truths as belonging to 
formal metaphysics, see Hua XXIV, p. 100, 1984, p. 97. As we have seen at the end of 
the previous section, the expression “formal metaphysics” appears once more in that 
course, but as a synonym of a priori ontology of the real.  
84 Hua XXIV, p. 157; 1984, p. 155. 
85 It is indeed worth mentioning that in the 1905/1906 course the usual reference to 
Aristotle’s notion of metaphysics is followed by an almost dismissive programmatic 
statement: “Today, we shall understand metaphysics itself differently, and more 
broadly.” Hua XXIV, p. 96; 1984, p. 93. 
86 “…Erkenntnistheorie als Wissenschaft bezieht sich auf Erkenntnis überhaupt. Sie ist 
nicht selbst Metaphysik, sondern das Fundament aller Metaphysik.” Hua Mat VII, p. 
37.  
87 Hua Mat VII, pp. 92-99.  
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